Kentucky’s constitutional standoff over the impeachment trial of Fayette Circuit Judge Julie Goodman has taken a dramatic turn — and the implications stretch far beyond one courtroom or one judge’s conduct.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in a 5-1 ruling, declared this week that the state’s General Assembly had overstepped its authority in pursuing impeachment proceedings against Judge Goodman. The majority opinion, penned by Chief Justice Debra Lambert, held that the legislature’s impeachment powers do not extend to conduct the Court regards as falling within the exclusive domain of the judiciary. The Court ordered the legislature to stand down entirely.
But here’s where it gets constitutionally thorny — and why this story demands serious attention.
The Kentucky Constitution doesn’t leave much room for interpretation on this matter. Section 66 gives the House of Representatives the “sole power of impeachment.” Section 67 places the responsibility of trying all impeachments squarely with the Senate. And crucially, Section 109, which governs judicial power, includes an explicit carve-out: “The impeachment powers of the General Assembly shall remain inviolate.”
That word — inviolate — is not decorative. Kentucky courts have themselves defined it to mean “unassailable,” a power that “cannot be annulled, obstructed, impaired, or restricted” by any other branch of government. It is difficult, then, to reconcile that definition with a Supreme Court order telling the legislature to cease its constitutionally assigned proceedings.
The Kentucky Senate Impeachment Trial and the Battle Over Constitutional Authority
The lone dissent came from Justice Shea Nickell, and by most readings of the plain constitutional text, his position is the stronger one. Nickell argued that the Kentucky Constitution simply does not authorise courts to weigh in on impeachment proceedings at all — that impeachment is a legislative function, and the supervisory writ issued by the majority cannot be squared with Section 109’s inviolate clause.
His dissenting view draws support from federal precedent too. In Nixon v. United States (1993), the US Supreme Court held that Senate impeachment trials constitute a political question beyond judicial review — precisely because the Constitution assigns that power to the legislature alone. Kentucky’s own constitutional text uses similarly exclusive language, and the principle applies no less forcefully at the state level.
The majority’s reasoning leans on the idea of co-equal branches and the judiciary’s role in protecting its own domain. That’s not an unreasonable instinct. But co-equality, properly understood, means each branch operates with full authority within its own constitutional lane — not that one branch can override another’s explicitly assigned powers. When a court orders the legislature to abandon a duly passed impeachment resolution, it isn’t preserving balance. It is tipping the scales decisively in its own favour.
Every Kentucky Senator took an oath to uphold the Kentucky Constitution — the full document, not just the sections the Supreme Court found useful. That constitution assigns the Senate the duty to try impeachments. It does not include an exception for cases where the judiciary objects.
Whether Judge Goodman’s conduct actually rises to the level warranting removal from the bench is, in many ways, a secondary question. The more foundational issue is who holds the constitutional authority to make that determination. The text of the Kentucky Constitution answers that clearly: the legislature does.
Proceeding with the impeachment trial is not an act of defiance against the courts. It is an act of fidelity to a constitution that assigned this specific power — clearly, deliberately, and without qualification — to the General Assembly. The Senate’s obligation is to conduct a fair trial, weigh the evidence on its merits, and deliver its verdict. That is what the Kentucky Constitution demands, and it is what the oath of every sitting senator requires.